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"LOSER PAYS": THE LATEST
INSTALLMENT IN THE BATTLE-
SCARRED, CLIFF-HANGING SURVIVAL
OF THE RULE 10b-5 CLASS ACTION
John C. Coffee, Jr.*
DEDICATION
HEN I was an upper-year student at Yale Law School in the
late 1960s, I was sometimes as undermotivated as contempo-
rary upper-year law students regularly appear to be. But there
was then an appropriate role model for us: a graduate student, brimming
with efficiency and self-discipline, who occupied a carrel in the law li-
brary, seemingly working day and night on a special research project. He
had piled law review articles and cases a foot or more about his carrel,
and anyone walking by could see that he seemed obsessed with some-
thing called Rule 10b-5. I had dimly heard of this rule, but did not pay it
much attention at the time because the Rule received only the briefest
mention in Baker and Cary (then virtually the only casebook on Corpora-
tions).1 Regrettably, I never struck up a conversation with this diligent
graduate student, who, of course, was Alan Bromberg, then working on
what became his authoritative treatise on securities fraud.2 Like ships
passing in the night, we did not meet. This brief article will constitute my
apology for my short-sightedness.
I. INTRODUCTION
Although Rule 10b-5 dates back to 1942,3 it did not truly become im-
* Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law at Columbia University Law School and Director
of the Center on Corporate Governance.
1. In that bygone era, there was typically only one (or at most two) textbooks used in
most courses at most law schools. Baker and Cary was the dominant Corporations
Casebook. Over time, it evolved into Cary, then Cary and Eisenberg, then Eisenberg, and
now Eisenberg and Cox. Needless to add, there was no casebook on Securities Regulation
in this era. The first such casebook was Jennings & Marsh, which later became Jennings,
Marsh & Coffee, and today Coffee, Sale and Henderson.
2. Over time, this book has grown from a single volume into eight volumes. Today, it
is known as BROMBERG AND LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES FRAUD
(ThomsonWest 2d ed. 2004). It has always maintained a reputation for excellence.
3. Rule lOb-5 was adopted virtually overnight by the SEC in 1942 when it learned
that the president of a small corporation was buying back stock from his shareholders
without disclosing that the company, long on the brink of insolvency, had recently received
some major government contracts. It is now largely forgotten that Rule lOb-5 was origi-
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portant until the modern class action was authorized by the revisions to
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted in 1966.4 Two
developments occurred more or less contemporaneously: (1) the Federal
Rules Committee authorized a class action for money damages by adopt-
ing Rule 23(b)(3) in that 1966 revision; and (2) the Second Circuit permit-
ted shareholders to sue their non-trading corporation for fraud under
Rule 10b-5 on the theory that the corporation's false statements "caused"
their purchase.5 Once shareholders were authorized to sue their corpora-
tion in federal court for material misstatements and omissions, the engine
underlying the modem securities class action had been turned on. It took
maybe a decade more for this engine to rev up and reach full speed.
Because the Rule 10b-5 class action had never been expressly author-
ized by Congress, it has always been under attack. Indeed, if one turns
back the clock to almost any time over the last forty-odd years, one can
identify a challenge to it that at that time seemed to threaten its very
existence. Yet, it has survived-sometimes by the skin of its teeth. Here, I
am reminded of the early silent movie serials that filled movie houses in
the first decades of the 20th Century. These short films were known as
"cliff-hangers" because at the end of each serial, the damsel was in dis-
tress, sometimes literally hanging off the edge of a cliff, while the evil
villain twirled his mustache.6 We could be at a similar moment today.
Among the notable crises in the cliff-hanging history of the Rule lOb-5
class action, the following moments stand out:
1. The Scienter Challenge: Did the plaintiff have to prove scienter,
and could the action survive such an obligation? It did, as the Court
ruled in 1976,7 but our heroine still survived.
2. The Reliance Challenge: Did each class member have to prove
individual reliance? If they did, how could this action be certified,
given that the "common" issues must predominate over the "individ-
nally intended to provide a seller's remedy (which otherwise was absent from the federal
securities laws). See comments of Milton Freeman (its principal draftsman), Conference on
Codification of the Federal Securities Code, 22 Bus. LAw. 799, 922 (1967).
4. In 1966, the Federal Rules Committee drafted revisions that for the first time au-
thorized an opt-out action for money damages in Rule 23(b)(3). Prior to those revisions,
the 1938 rules permitted only a limited form of class action for money damages was availa-
ble (it was termed a "spurious" class action), but it was essentially an opt-in class action
that did not bind absent class members. For an overview, see Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing
Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 81
HARV. L. REv. 353, 380-86 (1967). Once class actions obtained the ability in 1966 to bind
absent class members, their size and scale soared.
5. See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (holding
that the defendant caused the plaintiff's sales "whenever assertions are made ... in a
manner reasonably calculated to influence the investing public .... "); see also, Heit v.
Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968) (extending this doctrine to a private action).
6. The best known of these cliffhangers was the Perils of Pauline, a 1914 serial with
twenty episodes, starring Pearl White. As a matter of full disclosure, Wikipedia notes that
this serial constantly threatened its heroine with imminent death, but never actually fea-
tured her hanging from a cliff. See WIKIPEDIA, "The Perils of Pauline (1914 serial)."
7. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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ual" issues under Rule 23(b)(3)?8 Once again, a seemingly magical
solution was found: the Fraud-on-the-Market Doctrine.
9
3. Legislation: Would a hostile Congress kill the securities class ac-
tion? Congress seemingly tried in 1995, when it enacted the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act,10 but somehow our heroine again
survived.
4. The Economic Challenge: Would a more conservative Court re-
ject the Fraud-on-the-Market Doctrine in light of new evidence about
market efficiency? No one was certain what would happen in Halli-
burton 11,11 but once again nothing much happened.
12
Given this history of constant challenge and existential threat, one
should not be surprised that a new crisis has arisen. Last year, the Dela-
ware Supreme Court upheld at least the facial validity of one-way, fee-
shifting bylaws, approved by board action without a shareholder vote,
that shifted the corporation's (and all other defendants') legal expenses
against a plaintiff who either lost or was less than substantially success-
ful.13 Such one-way fee shifting against only the plaintiff is indeed a
threat, one that could greatly curtail securities class actions. But once
again, our heroine seems likely to survive, as this brief essay will explain.
II. THE SUPPLY SIDE: DELAWARE OFFERS FEE-SHIFTING-
AND THEN EQUIVOCATES
In retrospect, the issue of one-way fee-shifting against plaintiffs in
shareholder litigation did not arise because of any conscious plan or strat-
agem. Rather, the issue arose suddenly and arguably blindsided the Dela-
ware Supreme Court. A federal district court had found a fee-shifting
provision in the bylaws of a non-stock corporation to be preempted by
the federal antitrust laws where the bylaw required a losing (or margin-
ally successful) plaintiff to reimburse the corporation (and other parties)
for their legal expenses.14 On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed, finding
8. The language of Rule 23(b)(3) expressly requires that the "common issues of law
and fact predominate over individual issues."
9. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
10. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act added Section 21D ("Private Securi-
ties Litigation") and 21E ("Application of Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements")
to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4-78u-5. The former imposed
substantially higher pleading standards, addressed fee-shifting (as hereinafter discussed)
and presumptively delegated control of the securities class action to a "lead plaintiff" with
the largest stake in the action.
11. See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).
12. Although Halliburton II authorized defendants to challenge the certification of the
class by showing an absence of "price impact," the burden of proof was assigned to the
defendant, and no defendant has yet succeeded in meeting this burden. See, e.g., Local 703
I.B. of T. Grocery & Food Emps. Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin. Corp., 762 F.3d 1248 (11th
Cir. 2014); Aranez v. Catalyst Pharm. Partners Inc., 302 F.R.D. 657 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 29,
2014).
13. See ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014).
14. See Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97851 (D. Del. October 19,
2009) (the fees sought to be shifted came to $17,865,504.51).
2015]
SMU LAW REVIEW
that before the district court considered the federal preemption issue, it
should first determine if Delaware law permitted such a provision.15 The
Third Circuit seemed skeptical that Delaware would tolerate a "loser
pays" rule applicable only to the plaintiff. The District Court duly certi-
fied the issue to the Delaware Supreme Court, but only the question of
the facial validity of the provision was before the Delaware Supreme
Court.
The Delaware courts were then in the process of upholding the ability
of the bylaws to bind non-consenting shareholders through "forum selec-
tion" provisions that required a plaintiff to bring a derivative action or
merger class action only in Delaware.16 One suspects that "forum selec-
tion" provisions were favored in Delaware as a way of keeping profitable
litigation from migrating away from Delaware to other state courts (as
they had begun to do).17 As a result, the Delaware Supreme Court had
already bought into the theory that bylaws could change the rules of the
game without a shareholder vote and could bind shareholders who had
not been subject to them when they acquired their shares. All that was
new in the A TP Tour case was that these bylaws would now impose per-
sonal liability on a shareholder-a significant step and one in serious ten-
sion with the traditional limited liability of the shareholder. Nonetheless,
the Court in a brief opinion upheld the facial validity of the bylaw and
noted that it did not need to address the more complex issues that would
arise in an "as applied" review of such a bylaw.18
Even though the A TP Tour decision dealt with a non-stock member-
ship corporation and addressed only the facial validity of the bylaw, the
response to the decision was immediate. Corporations and other business
entities began to adopt such board-approved bylaws or, in the case of
issuers preparing for an initial public offering, to insert "loser-pays" pro-
visions into their certificates of incorporation. Between May 29, 2014, and
September 29, 2014, some twenty-four companies (including some limited
liability companies and limited partnerships that were planning a public
offering) adopted such a provision, either by a board-passed bylaw or a
charter provision (in the case of a firm planning an initial public offering
(or "IPO"). 19 Major law firms were beginning to use this technique, and it
15. Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 480 F. App'x 124, 126-28 (3d Cir. 2012).
16. See, e.g., City of Providence v. First Citizens Bancshares, Inc., 99 A.3d 229 (Del.
2014); Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013).
17. For discussions of this migration of cases involving Delaware corporations to non-
Delaware state court forums, see John Armour et al., Delaware's Balancing Act, 87 IND.
L.J. 1345, 1366-70 (2012); John Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMPmI-
CAL LEGAL STUD. 605 (2012).
18. See ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014).
19. See Testimony of Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. Before SEC Investor Advisory
Committee, October 9, 2014, "Fee-Shifting Bylaw and Charter Provisions: Can They Apply
in Federal Court?-The Case for Preemption," available at http://ssm.com/ab-
stract=2508973. Having been asked to testify before the SEC's Investor Advisory Commit-
tee, this author contacted several firms and obtained lists of companies that had adopted
such provisions. Subsequently, SEC Chairman Mary Jo White has estimated that "more
than 40 companies adopted some form of similar fee-shifting provisions." Mary Jo White,
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appeared as if such a "loser pays" provision would become part of the
standard preparation for an IPO. In the staid world of corporate law, this
was an uncharacteristically rapid response to a still very equivocal en-
dorsement of a "loser pays" provision.
For a time, it seemed as if there might be a hyperbolically increasing
rate of such adoptions. But then adoptions slowed. Why? Probably, two
reasons stand out: First, the major proxy advisors-Institutional Share-
holder Services ("ISS") and Glass-Lewis-took a strong position that
they would oppose the re-election of boards that adopted such a provi-
sion without a shareholder vote.20 In a time of heightened hedge fund
activism, few seasoned companies wanted to antagonize the institutional
investors who owned a majority of their stock and who were increasingly
disposed to support proxy contests. An activist hedge fund might exploit
the vulnerability of a company that offended its proxy advisors and de-
mand to both overturn the bylaw and place a representative on their
board. Second, the Delaware State Bar Association quickly indicated its
opposition to the A TP Tour decision and almost immediately began to
draft legislation to overturn it. The Delaware Bar was concerned that fee-
shifting provisions would reduce the volume of litigation in Delaware, an
outcome that would hurt both plaintiffs and defense firms and even re-
duce the Gross Domestic Product of the state.21 Legislation to reverse
A TP Tour was rushed forward in 2014, but many felt it had been too
hurried, and the legislature, caught in a tug-of-war between rival lobby-
ists, asked for further consideration. As a result, many issuers probably
decided to wait and see what Delaware did before acting.
In 2015, the Corporation Law Council (the 22-member body that must
draft corporate legislation for the Delaware State Bar Association) was
back with a new and different draft. Their proposed legislation would
amend Sections 102 and 109 of the Delaware General Corporation Law
("DGCL"), which provisions govern the contents of the certificate of in-
corporation and the bylaws, to provide that neither may contain a provi-
sion that "imposes liability on a stockholder for the attorney fees or
expenses of the corporation or any other party in connection with an in-
tracorporate claim."'22 That might seem to cover the waterfront, but in
fact the term "intracorporate claim" was given a very narrow definition.
A Few Observations on Shareholders in 2015, Speech Before Tulane University Law
School's 27th Annual Corporate Law Institute, March 19, 2015, at p. 5.
20. Both Institutional Shareholder Services and Glass Lewis & Co. have released up-
dated voting guidelines for the 2015 proxy season under which they would respond to the
"unilateral amendment" of the charter or bylaws to add a fee-shifting provision by recom-
mending votes against the directors who voted for the "unilateral" change. See LAw360,
Key Changes to ISS and Glass Lewis Voting Guidelines, December 16, 2014.
21. Of course, no public statement by the Delaware Bar Association would ever
phrase it this way. Instead, they would talk about the fairness of eliminating all legal re-
course. But the economic concern was palpably there, just below the surface.
22. See Section 1 of the legislation (copy on file with the SMU Law Review). For a
short description of the legislation (and a copy of the proposed bill); Francis Pileggi, Dela-
ware Proposes New Fee-Shifting and Forum Selection Legislation, DELAWARE CORP. &
CoM. LITIG. BLOG, March 6, 2015.
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In its proposed new Section 115 of the DGCL, the Corporation Law
Council defined "intracorporate claim" to mean "claims, including claims
in the right of the corporation, (I) that are based upon a violation of a
duty by a current or former director or officer or stockholder in such
capacity, or (II) as to which this title confers jurisdiction upon the Court
of Chancery.'23 This language reaches derivative actions, class actions
based on a breach of fiduciary duty (such as the standard merger class
action asserting that the directors sold the firm too cheaply), and ap-
praisal actions.24 But this language did not reach the securities class ac-
tion. Such suits are typically brought against the corporation itself, not
against an officer or employee, and they are not "based upon a violation
of a duty by a current or former director or officer," but on a material
misrepresentation or omission. The Corporation Law Council could have
easily broadened the definition of "intracorporate claim" to reach the se-
curities class action, but it seems to have intentionally stopped short.
Because the ATP Tour decision seemingly upheld fee-shifting bylaw
and charter provisions to the extent that they were not legislatively pro-
hibited, the net result is that this underinclusive definition of "intracorpo-
rate claim" arguably implied that fee-shifting bylaws and charter
provisions would be permitted (at least by Delaware law) in securities
class actions, but not in state court actions (i.e., derivative actions and
fiduciary breach class actions). This spared the Delaware Bar (which is
relatively infrequently involved in securities class actions), but greatly ex-
posed the securities plaintiffs' bar. The disparity in scale between these
two types of litigation is also vast. Derivative actions and breach of fiduci-
ary duty merger actions typically settle for non-pecuniary relief (most fre-
quently, consisting of revised disclosures about the merger's fairness),
while the settlements in securities class actions can top $1 billion or more.
Even more importantly, the expenses incurred by the corporation are
similarly disparate. Merger class actions are generally not actively liti-
gated and so only modest expenses are incurred. But the expenses in a
securities class action can easily exceed $10 million or more, which
amount will be shifted to the plaintiffs' attorneys if they are not "substan-
tially successful" under the standard bylaw provision.
Given these differences, why did the Corporation Law Council effec-
tively permit one-way fee-shifting in large cases, but not in small ones?
Several explanations seem plausible:
First, the interests of the Delaware Bar were only implicated by the
cases litigated in Delaware. Arguably, where the reason for the rule
stopped, so stopped the rule.
23. See Section 5 of the legislation (adding a new Section 115 to the DGCL).
24. The standard merger class action is designed to follow Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,
457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), and allege a breach of the duty of loyalty by the directors. Ap-
praisal actions fall within clause (II) of Section 115's definition of "intracorporate claim"
because the DGCL expressly authorizes them to be brought in the Court of Chancery.
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Second, the Corporation Law Council may have been nervous about
directly addressing federal litigation, seeing this as beyond its purview. Of
course, the upshot of this deference to federal courts was to impose a
burden on federal court litigation, which could be subject to a burden not
imposed on Delaware litigation.
Third, by allowing fee-shifting in securities litigation, Delaware may
have been addressing the problem of regulatory arbitrage. Throughout
the consideration of a ban on fee-shifting, Delaware was painfully aware
that if it prohibited "loser pays" fee-shifting and other, more permissive
jurisdictions did not, Delaware might lose market share in the market for
corporate charters. For example, if Nevada and Texas did not adopt simi-
lar legislation (and there is no reason to think that either would), corpo-
rate counsel might recommend to clients that they incorporate in those
more hospitable jurisdictions and thereby avoid litigation. However, by
drawing a line between state litigation (i.e., derivative actions and merger
litigation that is primarily brought in state courts) and federal litigation,
Delaware allowed corporate counsel to draft bylaw and charter provi-
sions that protected their clients from major, high stakes litigation, even if
it left them somewhat more exposed to small stakes, nuisance litigation.
Corporate counsel tend to perceive derivative actions as a nuisance and
securities class actions as a threat. If Delaware allowed them to protect
their clients from the threat, the fact that Delaware denied them the pro-
tection from nuisance litigation loomed less large.
From this last perspective, the Corporation Law Council may have
struck an artful balance, protecting a critical local constituency (the Bar)
without exposing Delaware to a significant loss of market share. That
may not have been the intent of their curious line drawing between state
and federal litigation, but it appears to be the effect. Although other ju-
risdictions may be able to offer corporations even more protection, there
are uncertainties and risks with migrating away from Delaware. If Dela-
ware truly was offering protection against securities litigation, many cor-
porations might regard that as a net plus.
At this point, it is necessary to shift our perspective from the supply
side to the demand side-in effect, from what Delaware can offer to what
corporations want.
III. THE DEMAND SIDE: WHAT DO CORPORATIONS WANT?
How likely is it that public corporations will adopt "loser pays" fee-
shifting provisions? As earlier noted, the major proxy advisors are ada-
mantly opposed to them, and in the world of corporate governance, ISS is
the 800 pound gorilla. But not all firms need fear ISS. Some have control-
ling shareholders or at least a highly concentrated control group that can
resist a proxy challenge. Thus, this is one category that might adopt such
provisions.
Another such category is firms planning an IPO. Typically, the firm's
underwriters and founders will conduct this planning. If they insert a
2015]
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"loser pays" provision into the firm's certificate before the IPO (and if it
is fully disclosed in the prospectus), the incoming shareholders can be
said to have acquiesced (or at least they cannot blame the board). Also,
there may be nothing that anyone (the board or shareholders) can do. For
example, the charter provision may be written so that it can be eliminated
only by an 80% shareholder vote, which is infeasible.
Thus, we might expect to see "loser pays" provisions in many IPOs and
also in some companies with controlling shareholders. Particularly in the
case of an IPO candidate, the founders and underwriters know that they
can be easily sued under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 if the
stock price drops after the IPO.25 There are few defenses to such a suit, as
the plaintiff need not prove scienter or even negligence; the burden of
showing due diligence falls instead on the defendants.
26
In short, many firms (or, at least, their founders and managers) will
want a "loser pays" provision (if they are enforceable), and they may be
prepared to incorporate outside of Delaware to obtain this advantage (if
necessary). Even if they believe that Delaware has the best judiciary with
regard to corporate law issues, they will likely consider it better not to be
sued than to be sued in front of an intelligent judiciary.
Even if this analysis suggests that some firms might migrate out of Del-
aware (mainly IPO firms), the premise to this argument is that such a
"loser pays" provision will be enforceable in federal court. Here, we next
encounter the critical unresolved issue that the new Delaware statute will
force courts to face sooner or later: is a "loser pays" provision preempted
by federal law?
IV. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF FEE SHIFTING?
Is a Delaware provision, primarily aimed at corporate governance (a
traditional and special concern of state law) likely to be preempted be-
cause of its conflict with the federal securities laws? Supreme Court cases
can be found on both sides of this issue. In 1949, after a number of states
had enacted "security for expenses" statutes that required a losing plain-
tiff in a derivative action to reimburse the corporation for its expenses,
27
the Court found such a statute to apply in federal court, even though the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not authorize such bonds.28 To
25. See Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k ("Civil Liabilities On
Account of False Registration Statement").
26. Section 11 imposes strict liability on the issuer for a materially false statement in a
registration statement and requires directors, officers, and underwriters to bear the burden
of proving a difficult, affirmative defense of "due diligence." Thus, directors and under-
writers have good reason to fear it.
27. New York and New Jersey were among the first states to legislate "security for
expense" statutes in the 1940s as a response to a perceived increase in "strike suits," but
characteristically Delaware did not adopt such a provision. Its longstanding policy has been
to attract, rather than deter, litigation. Its pending legislation will also authorize forum
selection provisions (but only provisions that name Delaware as the preferred forum);
again, this fits the same pattern of seeking to attract litigation.
28. See Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
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reach this result in Cohen v. Beneficial Loan,29 the Court had to interpret
the New Jersey statute as addressing corporate governance and not civil
procedure. But the same could conceivably be said with respect to a
"loser pays" rule that applied only in corporate litigation. That is, it could
be justified as an attempt to protect the corporation (and its officers and
directors) from "frivolous" litigation, and not an attempt to regulate
procedure.
On the other hand, Cohen was prior to the Court's 1965 decision in
Hanna v. Plumer,30 which established that only federal procedural rules
apply in federal court and that they are not superseded by state rules.
Following that precedent, the Court found in Burlington Northern Rail-
road v. Woods31 in 1987 that a state law requiring an appellant to post an
appeal bond did not apply in federal court, even though the action was in
federal court based only on diversity jurisdiction.
Still, some decisions have upheld the application of state fee-shifting
statutes in federal court, despite arguments that they conflicted with fed-
eral law. The most recent and relevant of these decisions is Smith v. Psy-
chiatric Solutions,32 which both found no conflict between fee shifting
under a state statute and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, emphasizing that the
state law only gave the court discretion to shift the winning side's applica-
ble fees to the loser (which the district court had done). But such a case
arises in a different context. The unique twist to the proposed Delaware
statute is that it seemingly permits a "loser pays" bylaw or charter provi-
sion to apply only in federal court and not in state court. This is very
different than applying a state security for expense bond in federal court
in order to realize state law corporate governance objectives. Indeed, if
Delaware law is read to uphold "loser pays" bylaws and charter provi-
sions in federal court, it would produce the paradoxical result of Dela-
ware mandating a rule in federal court that it forbids in its own courts.
This might seem to strike federal courts as both a discriminatory attempt
to burden federal litigation and a case of overreaching that was not justi-
fied by any valid state purpose. Even though Delaware's Corporation
Law Council may have felt that it was exercising restraint in addressing
only Delaware litigation, the net effect of its limited overruling of A TP
Tour was to formulate a rule that applies only in federal court (and with-
out any clear justification).
Federal preemption law is complicated, and this makes it necessary to
condense the complicated law on preemption into a brief nutshell. Essen-
tially, the black letter law of preemption recognizes three distinct catego-
ries of preemption: express preemption, field preemption, and implied
conflict (or "obstacle") preemption.33 Express preemption is not applica-
29. Id.
30. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
31. 480 U.S. 1 (1987).
32. 750 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2013).
33. For this tripartite division of preemption doctrine, see Hillsborough City Fla. v.
Automated Med. Labs, 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985).
20151
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ble here,34 but the latter two theories may be. "Field preemption" recog-
nizes that there are some contexts where Congress has so dominated the
field as to leave little or no room for state action.35 "Obstacle" preemp-
tion instead looks to whether the state rule creates a substantial obstacle
that frustrates a Congressional policy.36 No bright-line division separates
these two doctrines, and the "cornerstone" of both doctrines is that the
"purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every preemption
case. ,37
Although a good argument can be made for field preemption because
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) comprehensively
prescribes standards for securities class actions, it is simpler to make the
case for "obstacle prevention." In overview, the PSLRA expresses at
least two important federal policies that are frustrated by a "loser pays"
rule.
First, a major goal of the PSLRA was to shift control of the securities
class action from nominal "in-house" plaintiffs, who held only 100 shares
but had sued in hundreds of cases, to institutional investors who had a
real stake in the action and could monitor class counsel.38 It did this by
creating a presumption that the "lead plaintiff" (its term) would be the
person or group with the largest stake in the action.39 As a direct result,
public pension funds are now the most common "lead plaintiffs" in secur-
ities class actions (but not in other litigation contexts). Now, look at what
would happen under a "loser pays" rule. The public pension fund owes its
primary duty to its pensioners. It knows that over half of securities class
actions have recently been dismissed before trial,40 and thus it would face
liability in at least that percentage of the cases-and maybe more if the
"loser pays" provision required (as most do) that the plaintiff be "sub-
stantially successful" on all its theories and recover most of its alleged
damages to avoid fee shifting. In "real world" litigation, this level of suc-
cess is rare.
34. The federal securities laws do contain a number of express preemption provisions.
See Section 18 of the Securities Act of 1933 ("Exemption from State Regulation of Securi-
ties Offerings"); 15 U.S.C. § 77r.
35. See Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982). But
see Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
36. For an early such case, see Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
37. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (quoting Medtronic v. Lahr, 518
U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
38. In the era before the PSLRA, a limited number of individuals-most notably
Harry Lewis and William Weinberger-served as the class representative in hundreds of
class and derivative actions, based only on nominal stock holdings. They in effect served as
the "in house" plaintiffs for some law firms.
39. See Section 21D(a)(3) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4.
40. A recent Cornerstone Research report covering the period through 2014 finds that
for securities class actions filed in 2009, 2010, and 2011, the dismissal rates are 51%, 59%,
and 58% respectively. The dismissal rates are lower (so far) for 2012 and 2013, but this
probably reflects the likelihood that judicial decisions have not yet been reported on mo-
tions to dismiss for actions filed in those later years. See Cornerstone Research, "Securities
Class Action Filings: 2014 Year in Review" (2015) at Figure 10, p. 12. Hence, a public
pension fund must face the probability that fees will be shifted against it.
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In overview, there is a substantial asymmetry between the pension
fund's likely gains and losses. If there is a settlement, plaintiffs will likely
receive 1-3 percent of their market losses (in terms of the decline in the
stock's market capitalization),41 but if the case is lost, the pension fund
would be alone liable for the corporate defendant's expenses, which in a
securities class action could easily exceed $10 million (and other defend-
ants will also have claims). Thus, as a fiduciary to its pensioners, the pub-
lic pension fund will have difficulty accepting a 50 percent chance of such
a liability (and an even higher risk under a "substantial" success stan-
dard) in return for a 50 percent (or so) chance of recovering 1-3 percent
of its market losses in a settlement.
Conceivably, class counsel could agree to indemnify the public pension
fund serving as lead plaintiff, but this is uncharted territory. Indeed, there
are arguments that legal ethics preclude plaintiff's counsel from indemni-
fying its client's fee-shifting losses.42 Even if the law firm serving as class
counsel can do this, it might become insolvent and thus unable to pay.
Finally, even if insurance is available, insurers will likely demand large co-
insurance or minimum deductible provisions.43 As a result, many pension
funds may be unwilling to accept this risk and will no longer serve as lead
plaintiff, thereby frustrating Congress's original intent in the PSLRA.
Ironically, the one party who could rationally serve as a lead plaintiff
under a "loser pays" rule will be the judgment-proof, nominal plaintiff
with no assets. A plaintiff's law firm could arrange to give a few shares to
a number of otherwise-asset-poor plaintiffs, and they could serve as lead
plaintiffs (if no one else was willing). In short, we would have come full
circle from an original environment of nominal plaintiffs to one of sub-
stantial plaintiffs capable of monitoring and then finally back to the start-
ing point. If this happened, Congress's intent would have been frustrated.
A second Congressional policy that would be frustrated is that set forth
in Section 21D(c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which was ad-
ded by the PSLRA.44 Captioned "Sanctions for Abusive Litigation," it
specifically addresses the problem of frivolous litigation, but in a different
41. See Bulan, Ryan & Simmons, Securities Class Action Settlements-2013 Review
and Analysis (Cornerstone Research 2013) at 8. There is, of course, much variation among
Circuits.
42. The American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide in
Model Rule 1.8(e) that a lawyer may not provide "financial assistance to a client in connec-
tion with pending or contemplated litigation," but it does permit a lawyer to "advance
court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the
outcome of the matter." Whether this last exception for court costs includes shifted fees is
very uncertain, with little, if any, guidance in the case law. Model Rule 1.8 is premised on
the idea that "[1]awyers may not subsidize lawsuits ... because such assistance gives law-
yers too great a financial stake in the litigation." See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.8 cmt. 10 (2013).
43. Insurers need to do this to control the adverse selection problem that arises if they
provide 100% insurance. Class counsel would probably have to agree to indemnify the
pension fund for such amounts, and again there would be doubt both about its ability to
pay and the legality of such payments.
44. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21D(c); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4.
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and more balanced fashion. Essentially, it provides that at the conclusion
of a securities case, the court must make findings as to whether both sides
have complied with Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
45
If the court finds a violation by either side, then Section 21D(c)(2) pro-
vides that sanctions are mandatory,46 and Section 21D(c)(3) creates a
presumption that the appropriate sanction is to shift the opposing side's
"reasonable attorneys' fees" to the side that violated Rule 11(b).4 7 Fi-
nally, Section 21D(c)(3)(A)(ii) requires the court first find a "substantial
failure" to comply with Rule 11(b) in the case of a claim that the com-
plaint was so deficient as to flunk Rule 11(b)'s standards.
48
So what are the differences between Section 21D(c) and a "loser pays"
rule? First, the PSLRA provision is two-sided, while "loser pays" provi-
sions in bylaws and charters are inevitably one-sided, applying only to the
plaintiff. Second, while a "loser pays" provision is automatic, Section
21D(c) relies on judicial discretion and interposes the court before any
penalty is imposed. Third, Section 21D(c) requires not simply a technical
failure, but a "substantial failure" in the case of a claim that the com-
plaint was frivolous. In sum, Congress in the PSLRA decided to impose
sanctions only for culpable behavior (and only for a "substantial failure"),
whereas sanctions are automatic under a "loser pays" rule (even when
the plaintiff is marginally successful under the popular "substantial suc-
cess" variation on the "loser pays" formula).
Put differently, Congress opted to use a scalpel (possibly to preserve
the viability of meritorious securities class actions), while defendants that
adopt "loser pays" provisions are choosing the meat ax. As a result, the
broader sweep and automatic imposition of fee shifting under "loser
pays" bylaws and charter provisions arguably frustrates the more reason-
able balance that Congress struck in the PSLRA.
One possible rebuttal must be faced to these arguments that Dela-
ware's unique "loser pays" rule conflicts with the policies underlying the
federal securities laws and therefore should be preempted (at least in fed-
eral securities cases). The claim can be made that Delaware has not acted
to mandate a "loser pays" rule, but has only recognized that private par-
ties may adopt such a rule. Yet, this distinction between mandating and
authorizing is ultimately meaningless, and courts have not hesitated in the
past to strike down corporate actions that were simply authorized by state
law where they were inconsistent with the federal securities laws. The
best examples are those decisions refusing to permit indemnification of
securities law liabilities pursuant to state indemnification statutes.49 The
45. See id. § 21D (c)(1) ("Mandatory Review by Court").
46. See id. § 21D (c)(2) ("Mandatory Sanctions").
47. See id. § 21D (c)(3) ("Presumption in Favor of Attorneys' Fees and Costs").
48. See id. § 21D (c)(3)(A)(ii); see also id. § 21D (c)(3)(B), which permits this pre-
sumption to be rebutted by a showing that the fee-shifting would "impose an unreasonable
burden."
49. A number of federal decisions have found indemnification of securities law liabili-
ties to be against public policy and therefore preempted, despite broad state indemnifica-
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SEC has consistently argued that indemnification of such liabilities is con-
trary to the policies underlying the federal securities laws, and it requires
every issuer to acknowledge this in its registration statement.50 The bot-
tom line is that what the state cannot do directly by mandating a rule, it
also cannot do directly by authorizing the same rule. Thus, even if a
"loser pays" rule can be enforced in state court with respect to other
forms of litigation, it should not be enforceable in federal court where it
would deter the bringing of meritorious securities law claims.
V. CONCLUSION
Delaware has now passed the Corporation Law Council's amendments,
but no court, state or federal, has yet interpreted them. Eventually, the
issue of federal preemption must move to center stage because "loser
pays" provisions will be adopted by corporations in other states where
Delaware law will be inapplicable. Potentially, private enforcement of
Rule 10b-5 faces another existential crisis. My prediction is that it will
easily survive this challenge.51 But still other challenges will come in the
future, as they have in the past. As a result, Alan Bromberg's treatise on
securities fraud will need regular updating, but it will remain relevant to
future generations, as the goal of full disclosure will always have its
enemies.
tion statutes. See Globus v. Law Research Serv., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969); Heizer v.
Ross, 601 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979).
50. SEC Regulation S-K generally requires an issuer to include in its registration state-
ment a mandatory undertaking under which the issuer acknowledges that (i) the SEC con-
siders indemnification of liabilities under the Securities Act of 1933 to be "against public
policy.., and therefore unenforceable," and (ii) before any claim in respect of such indem-
nification is paid, the issuer will submit to a "court of appropriate jurisdiction the question
whether such public policy is against public policy." See Item 512(h)(3) of Regulation S-K.
17 C.F.R. § 229.512(h)(3).
51. An important straw in the wind is a recent speech by the SEC Chair Mary Jo
White in which she criticized "loser pays" fee-shifting in securities cases, indicated that the
SEC is following developments closely, and stated that she is "concerned about any provi-
sion in the bylaws of a company that could stifle shareholders' ability to seek redress under
the federal securities laws." See Chairman Mary Jo White, supra note 19, at 5. The SEC
could ask a federal court in an amicus brief to deem such a board-adopted bylaw to be
preempted. Or, it could refuse to "accelerate" a registration statement of a company that
had adopted such a bylaw or charter provision. The SEC has long taken this latter course
with respect to mandatory arbitration provisions in corporate charters and bylaws, and the
effect of a fee-shifting provision is analogous.
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